China since Tiananmen: From Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, Second Edition
Authors: Joseph Fewsmith Tags: china, politics, economics, nationalism Publication Year: 2008
Overview
In this book, I trace the complex and often contradictory evolution of China’s politics, society, and intellectual life in the two decades following the traumatic events of June 4, 1989. Many observers at the time predicted either the imminent collapse of the Chinese Communist Party or a permanent retreat from economic reform. Neither occurred. Instead, China experienced a period of staggering economic growth alongside profound social and political reconfiguration. My purpose is to explain how this happened by moving beyond simplistic narratives of a monolithic state versus a dissident society. I delve into the deep divisions within the political elite, the intellectual ferment that redefined the very meaning of reform, and the immense social changes that reshaped the country. The central argument is that the post-Tiananmen era was not a monolithic period of repression but a dynamic contest over China’s future. The initial years were defined by a fierce [[line struggle]] between Deng Xiaoping’s reformers and Party conservatives, a battle Deng ultimately won with his 1992 ‘Southern Tour.’ This victory, however, did not restore the liberal, cosmopolitan intellectual mood of the 1980s. Instead, the 1990s gave rise to new, more conservative and nationalist currents of thought—[[neoconservatism]], [[neostatism]], and a potent [[popular nationalism]]—that questioned the universal applicability of Western models and emphasized stability, state capacity, and national identity. I analyze how Jiang Zemin navigated these currents to consolidate his power and how the leadership under Hu Jintao shifted its focus to address the severe social inequalities and governance challenges that were the byproduct of two decades of breakneck, unbalanced growth. This work is for anyone seeking to understand the forces that have shaped contemporary China, providing essential context for its current domestic policies and its role as a major global power.
Book Distillation
1. Tiananmen and the conservative critique of reform
The immediate aftermath of the 1989 crackdown was a period of intense political struggle within the Party elite. Conservatives, who had long been wary of the direction of reform, seized the opportunity to launch a systemic critique of the policies championed by Deng Xiaoping and the purged Zhao Ziyang. They argued that marketization and opening up had led to ‘bourgeois liberalization’ and social chaos, advocating a return to central planning and ideological orthodoxy. Deng Xiaoping, though his prestige was damaged, used his status as the ‘core’ of the leadership to prevent a full reversal of reform and to install Jiang Zemin as the new General Secretary, a compromise figure intended to maintain a balance between factions.
Key Quote/Concept:
The ‘Core’ of the Party
2. Deng moves to revive reform
By late 1990, the conservative ascendancy had led to economic stagnation, prompting Deng Xiaoping to launch a counteroffensive. Frustrated with the caution in Beijing, Deng used Shanghai as a platform to advocate for bolder reforms. This culminated in his famous 1992 ‘Southern Tour,’ where he delivered a series of speeches arguing that the main danger to China was from the ‘left,’ not the right, and that the primary criterion for judging any policy was whether it developed the ‘productive forces.’ This tour decisively broke the political deadlock, sidelined the conservatives, and unleashed a new wave of marketization and rapid economic growth, setting the agenda for the Fourteenth Party Congress.
Key Quote/Concept:
Deng’s Southern Tour (nanxun)
3. The emergence of neoconservatism
The political and intellectual vacuum after Tiananmen, combined with the shock of the Soviet Union’s collapse, gave rise to [[neoconservatism]]. This school of thought, with roots in the pre-1989 debates on ‘new authoritarianism,’ rejected both the radical liberalism of the 1980s and the old-style Marxist orthodoxy. Neoconservatives argued for a strong, centralized state to maintain stability, guide market reforms incrementally, and prevent the chaos that had engulfed the former socialist bloc. They emphasized gradualism, state capacity, and a pragmatic approach to governance over utopian ideals of either socialism or democracy.
Key Quote/Concept:
New Authoritarianism
4. The enlightenment tradition under challenge
The intellectual consensus of the 1980s, which was based on the May Fourth ‘Enlightenment’ tradition of science, democracy, and cosmopolitanism, shattered in the 1990s. A new intellectual cleavage emerged between liberals and the [[New Left]]. Liberals, like Li Shenzhi, continued to advocate for the unfinished project of the May Fourth movement, emphasizing democracy and individual rights. The New Left, influenced by Western critical theory and postmodernism, challenged the Enlightenment project itself. They critiqued the social inequality, corruption, and loss of national autonomy they saw as products of marketization and globalization, questioning whether Western-style liberalism was the solution to China’s problems.
Key Quote/Concept:
The New Left vs. Liberals
5. The emergence of neostatism and popular nationalism
Two powerful currents gained prominence in the mid-1990s: neostatism and popular nationalism. [[Neostatism]], articulated by scholars like Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang, focused on the problem of declining ‘state capacity.’ They argued that decentralizing reforms had weakened the central government’s ability to collect taxes and manage the economy, risking national disintegration. Simultaneously, a potent [[popular nationalism]] emerged, exemplified by best-selling books like China Can Say No. This trend reflected widespread public frustration with US foreign policy and a populist critique of a Chinese elite seen as corrupt and overly deferential to the West.
Key Quote/Concept:
State Capacity
6. Jiang Zemin’s rise to power
Following Deng’s 1992 Southern Tour and leading up to Deng’s death in 1997, Jiang Zemin moved methodically to consolidate his authority. Initially a cautious figurehead, Jiang gradually established himself as the ‘core’ of the ‘third generation’ of leadership. He balanced different factions, promoted key allies from Shanghai, and used a high-profile anti-corruption campaign to remove powerful political rivals, most notably Beijing Party Secretary Chen Xitong. This process marked a shift from the charismatic, informal power of Deng to a more bureaucratic and institutional form of rule.
Key Quote/Concept:
Consolidation of the ‘Third Generation’ Core
7. Elite politics in an era of globalization and nationalism
The period from Deng’s death to the early 2000s was defined by the tension between China’s deepening integration into the global economy and the rise of nationalism. The Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997 endorsed major reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the policy of ‘grasping the large and letting go of the small.’ At the same time, the leadership pursued WTO accession to lock in these reforms. This push for globalization clashed with a surge of popular nationalism, which was inflamed by events like the 1999 US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, forcing the leadership to navigate between domestic political pressures and international engagement.
Key Quote/Concept:
Grasping the Large, Letting Go of the Small (zhuada fangxiao)
8. Hu Jintao takes over: a turn to the left?
The leadership transition to Hu Jintao in 2002 marked a significant policy shift. While Jiang Zemin’s era focused on rapid, coastal-led economic growth, the Hu-Wen administration responded to the mounting social problems this model created: vast regional inequality, rural stagnation, environmental degradation, and widespread social unrest. This new agenda represented a ‘turn to the left’ in policy, though not in political ideology. It was articulated through new official slogans like the [[Scientific Development Concept]] and building a ‘Harmonious Society,’ which prioritized balanced growth, social justice, and stability over pure GDP maximization.
Key Quote/Concept:
Scientific Development Concept and Harmonious Society
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Essential Questions
1. How did the Chinese Communist Party manage to survive the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown and revive economic reform against conservative opposition?
Contrary to predictions of collapse, the CCP survived and revived reform through a combination of brutal repression, shrewd political maneuvering by Deng Xiaoping, and a critical internal [[line struggle]]. Immediately after Tiananmen, Party conservatives launched a systemic critique, blaming market reforms for the ‘bourgeois liberalization’ that led to the protests and causing economic stagnation. Deng Xiaoping, though his prestige was damaged, used his informal but immense power as the leadership ‘core’ to prevent a full reversal. He installed Jiang Zemin as a compromise leader to balance factions. The crucial turning point was Deng’s 1992 ‘Southern Tour.’ Frustrated with conservative caution in Beijing, he traveled to the southern special economic zones, delivering speeches that decisively shifted the political narrative. He argued that the main danger was from the ‘left’ (hardline conservatives) and that the key criterion for any policy was its ability to develop ‘productive forces.’ This tour broke the political deadlock, sidelined the conservatives, and unleashed a massive new wave of marketization and economic growth, demonstrating that elite power struggles, rather than popular movements, were the primary driver of policy in this period.
2. What new intellectual currents emerged in the 1990s, and how did they challenge the liberal, cosmopolitan ‘Enlightenment’ consensus of the 1980s?
The 1990s witnessed the shattering of the 1980s intellectual consensus, which was rooted in the May Fourth ‘Enlightenment’ tradition of science, democracy, and cosmopolitanism. In the political and intellectual vacuum following Tiananmen and the collapse of the Soviet Union, several new, more state-centric and nationalist ideologies emerged. [[Neoconservatism]] argued for a strong, authoritarian state to ensure stability while guiding gradual market reforms. [[Neostatism]], championed by scholars like Hu Angang, focused on rebuilding central government [[state capacity]] (e.g., tax collection) which they argued had been dangerously eroded by decentralization. The [[New Left]], using Western critical theory, attacked the Enlightenment project itself, critiquing the profound social inequality and corruption generated by marketization and globalization. Finally, a potent [[popular nationalism]] arose, exemplified by books like China Can Say No, reflecting public frustration with US foreign policy and a critique of a Chinese elite seen as too deferential to the West. These currents collectively questioned the universal applicability of Western models and reoriented intellectual debate toward stability, state power, and national identity, creating a much more complex and fragmented intellectual landscape.
3. How did the leadership under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao evolve to address the consequences of two decades of rapid, unbalanced economic growth?
The leaderships of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao represent two distinct phases of adaptation to the consequences of reform. Jiang Zemin, after being installed by Deng, spent the 1990s methodically consolidating his power, moving from a compromise figure to the undisputed ‘core’ of the ‘third generation.’ His era was defined by navigating the tension between deepening global economic integration (such as WTO accession) and rising [[popular nationalism]]. His administration oversaw the massive, often painful, reform of state-owned enterprises under the policy of ‘grasping the large and letting go of the small.’ However, this period of breakneck growth created severe social dislocations. The subsequent leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, beginning in 2002, marked a significant policy shift to address these problems. Their agenda, articulated through concepts like the [[Scientific Development Concept]] and building a ‘Harmonious Society,’ represented a ‘turn to the left’ in policy. It prioritized balanced growth, social justice, environmental protection, and alleviating rural stagnation over the pure GDP maximization that characterized the Jiang era, reflecting a state-led effort to manage the profound inequalities its own policies had created.
Key Takeaways
1. Elite Politics and Line Struggles Drive Policy
The book’s central argument is that China’s trajectory after 1989 was not a simple story of state repression versus society, but a dynamic and high-stakes contest within the political elite. The critical battle between Deng Xiaoping’s reformers and Party conservatives, known as a [[line struggle]], determined the country’s direction. Deng’s victory, sealed by his 1992 Southern Tour, was not inevitable; it was a deliberate political counteroffensive against a conservative faction that had stalled the economy and sought to reverse market reforms. This takeaway is crucial because it reveals that even in a highly authoritarian system, policy is not monolithic. It is the outcome of fierce internal debates and power struggles between factions with deeply different ideological visions and material interests. Understanding these internal dynamics is key to deciphering Chinese policy shifts, which often appear abrupt to outsiders but are the culmination of prolonged, hidden contests.
Practical Application: For an AI product engineer, this means recognizing that the Chinese market and regulatory environment are not static or uniform. A product’s success can depend on its alignment with the priorities of the currently dominant political faction. For instance, an AI product for financial services might face headwinds during a conservative push for stability, but find opportunities when a reformist faction prioritizes market efficiency. Engineers should monitor elite political signals to anticipate shifts in industrial policy, funding priorities, and regulatory attitudes that could impact their product’s viability.
2. Ideology Evolves to Justify State Action and Legitimacy
The book meticulously traces the evolution of political and intellectual thought in the 1990s, showing how ideology adapted to new realities. The liberal, pro-Western consensus of the 1980s collapsed, replaced by ideologies that better served the state’s need for stability and control. [[Neoconservatism]] and [[neostatism]] provided an intellectual framework for a strong state guiding the economy. The rise of [[popular nationalism]] allowed the state to channel public frustration towards external targets, particularly the U.S. Even the [[New Left]]’s critique of inequality was eventually co-opted by the Hu-Wen administration’s focus on a ‘Harmonious Society.’ This demonstrates that in China, ideology is not a rigid dogma but a flexible tool used by the state to legitimize its actions, respond to social crises, and build consensus for its policy agenda. The shift from one dominant ideology to another provides a map of the state’s changing priorities and anxieties.
Practical Application: An AI product engineer must understand the prevailing ideological currents to position their product effectively. A product framed solely around Western concepts of individual empowerment or disruption might clash with the dominant narrative. However, framing an AI tool in terms of its contribution to ‘social harmony’ (e.g., by reducing traffic congestion), ‘national rejuvenation’ (e.g., by advancing domestic semiconductor design), or ‘scientific development’ (e.g., by optimizing energy grids) can align it with state goals, making it more attractive to partners, investors, and regulators in China.
3. Unbalanced Growth Creates Social Crises that Force Policy Correction
The book highlights a recurring pattern: a period of rapid, concentrated economic growth leads to severe social side effects, which in turn forces a policy correction from the leadership. The hyper-growth of the Jiang Zemin era, focused on coastal regions and global integration, created massive problems: a widening urban-rural gap, environmental ruin, rural stagnation, and widespread corruption. These issues became so acute that they threatened social stability, the CCP’s primary concern. The subsequent Hu-Wen administration’s ‘left turn’ in policy—with its focus on a [[Scientific Development Concept]] and ‘Harmonious Society’—was not a rejection of growth but a necessary course correction to manage its consequences and maintain legitimacy. This shows that the CCP is responsive to social pressures, not out of democratic impulse, but out of a pragmatic need to ensure its own survival by preventing widespread unrest.
Practical Application: This pattern creates opportunities for AI product engineers. As China’s leadership pivots to address the ‘unbalanced’ aspects of its development, there is a growing market for technologies that solve these specific problems. For example, AI applications in precision agriculture to boost rural incomes, telemedicine to serve underdeveloped regions, environmental monitoring to combat pollution, or smart grid technology to promote sustainability are directly aligned with the state’s corrective policy agenda. Engineers who can demonstrate that their products help create a more ‘harmonious’ or ‘scientifically developed’ society will find a more receptive audience than those focused purely on luxury or entertainment.
Suggested Deep Dive
Chapter: Part II: Redefining Reform: The Search for a New Way (Chapters 3-5)
Reason: This section is the intellectual core of the book. It moves beyond the narrative of elite power struggles to explain the ideas that shaped the 1990s and beyond. For an AI engineer trying to understand the ‘why’ behind China’s state-led tech strategy, its emphasis on stability, and its complex relationship with the West, these chapters are essential. They detail the rise of [[neoconservatism]], the [[New Left]], [[neostatism]], and [[popular nationalism]], providing the ideological blueprint for the China that exists today. Understanding this intellectual shift is crucial for grasping the deep-seated motivations behind Chinese industrial policy, regulation, and national strategy.
Key Vignette
Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour
In early 1992, with economic reform stalled by Party conservatives in Beijing, an aging Deng Xiaoping embarked on his famous ‘Southern Tour’ (nanxun). Frustrated with the ideological paralysis, he bypassed the central leadership and took his message directly to the booming special economic zones of the south. In a series of powerful speeches, he declared that the main danger to China was not from the ‘right’ but from the ‘left,’ and that the only test of a policy was whether it developed the ‘productive forces.’ This tour was a masterful act of political theater, breaking the political deadlock, sidelining his conservative rivals, and unleashing the next wave of market-driven growth that would define the decade.
Memorable Quotes
The main danger to China is from the ‘left,’ not the right. The primary criterion for judging any policy is whether it developed the ‘productive forces.’
— Page 48, Deng moves to revive reform
The decentralizing reforms have dangerously weakened our [[state capacity]], risking national disintegration if we cannot re-centralize our ability to manage the economy.
— Page 140, The emergence of neostatism and popular nationalism
We must be ‘grasping the large and letting go of the small’ to reform our state-owned enterprises and prepare for global competition.
— Page 197, Elite politics in an era of globalization and nationalism
Our focus must shift to the [[Scientific Development Concept]] and the building of a ‘Harmonious Society’ to address the inequalities born from unbalanced growth.
— Page 231, Hu Jintao takes over: a turn to the left?
Marketization and opening up have led to ‘bourgeois liberalization’ and social chaos; we must return to ideological orthodoxy.
— Page 21, Tiananmen and the conservative critique of reform
Comparative Analysis
Joseph Fewsmith’s China since Tiananmen offers a distinct perspective compared to other major works on contemporary China. While books like Barry Naughton’s The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth provide a comprehensive economic analysis of the reform period, Fewsmith’s primary contribution is his deep dive into the interplay between [[elite politics]] and intellectual history. He is less concerned with econometric data and more with the ‘line struggles’ and ideological debates that shape policy from the top down. Unlike journalistic accounts such as Evan Osnos’s Age of Ambition, which masterfully captures the social and personal transformations of individuals, Fewsmith’s focus remains squarely on the high-level political and intellectual actors who set the national agenda. His work shares some ground with Richard McGregor’s The Party, which also explores the inner workings of the CCP, but Fewsmith’s unique strength lies in tracing the genealogy of the ideas—from [[neoconservatism]] to the [[New Left]]—that provided the intellectual justification for the Party’s evolving strategies. He explains not just what the leadership did, but why they thought it was the right thing to do, providing an essential intellectual history of China’s post-1989 path.
Reflection
Reading my work, China since Tiananmen, provides a crucial map for understanding the complex and often contradictory forces that have shaped contemporary China. My central argument is that the post-1989 era cannot be understood through simplistic binaries of repression vs. freedom. Instead, it was a period of intense contestation over the very meaning of reform, waged both within the halls of power and in the pages of intellectual journals. The book’s strength lies in its detailed excavation of these elite debates and shifting ideological currents, from Deng’s battle against conservatives to the rise of [[neostatism]] and [[nationalism]]. This provides a robust framework for understanding why China pursued a path of state-led capitalism rather than liberal democracy. A potential weakness, from a certain perspective, is its top-down focus; the lived experiences of ordinary people are viewed primarily through the lens of the problems they posed to policymakers. My perspective is that of a political scientist analyzing the structures of power and ideology. While I strive for objectivity, my analysis is grounded in the belief that elite decisions and intellectual frameworks have an outsized impact in China’s political system. The book’s ultimate significance is its argument that China’s present course was not preordained, but was forged in the crucible of specific political and intellectual struggles that continue to define its trajectory.
Flashcards
Card 1
Front: What was Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 ‘Southern Tour’ (nanxun)?
Back: A pivotal trip to southern China where Deng Xiaoping, frustrated with conservative opposition in Beijing, delivered speeches arguing that the main danger was from the ‘left’ (anti-reformers) and that economic development was the primary task. It broke a political deadlock and unleashed a new wave of marketization.
Card 2
Front: Define [[neoconservatism]] as it emerged in 1990s China.
Back: An intellectual current that, reacting to the chaos of 1989 and the collapse of the USSR, advocated for a strong, centralized state to maintain stability and guide gradual market reforms. It rejected both 1980s liberalism and old-style Marxist orthodoxy.
Card 3
Front: What is the core argument of [[neostatism]]?
Back: Promoted by scholars like Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang, it argued that the decentralizing reforms of the 1980s had dangerously weakened the central government’s ‘[[state capacity]]’ (e.g., ability to collect taxes), risking economic instability and even national disintegration.
Card 4
Front: What was the main conflict between the [[New Left]] and Liberals in 1990s China?
Back: Liberals continued the 1980s ‘Enlightenment’ project, advocating for democracy and individual rights. The New Left, influenced by Western critical theory, challenged this project, critiquing the social inequality, corruption, and loss of national autonomy caused by marketization and globalization.
Card 5
Front: What was Jiang Zemin’s policy of ‘grasping the large and letting go of the small’ (zhuada fangxiao)?
Back: A major reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from the mid-1990s. It involved concentrating state support on a few hundred large, strategic SOEs while allowing thousands of smaller ones to be privatized, merged, or shut down.
Card 6
Front: What policy shift was signaled by the Hu-Wen administration’s slogans ‘[[Scientific Development Concept]]’ and ‘Harmonious Society’?
Back: A ‘turn to the left’ in policy (not ideology) away from pure GDP growth. It aimed to address severe social problems created by unbalanced development, such as regional inequality, rural stagnation, and environmental damage, by prioritizing balanced and sustainable growth.
Card 7
Front: What was the ‘line struggle’ in the immediate post-Tiananmen period (1989-1992)?
Back: A fierce internal conflict within the CCP elite between Deng Xiaoping’s reformers, who wanted to continue and deepen market reforms, and Party conservatives, who blamed reforms for the 1989 protests and wanted to return to central planning and ideological orthodoxy.
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